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THE SCOPE OF BAR ORDERS IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES FRAUD SETTLEMENTS
DAVID KAPLAN
INTRODUCTION
Parties entering into a partial settlement1 of a securities fraud
class action typically seek, in connection with the court’s approval of
the settlement,2 an order barring categories of claims made by or
against the settling parties that relate to or arise out of the settled
federal securities fraud claims.3 Before the passage of the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),4 courts grappled
with the equity of orders extinguishing these third parties’ rights.5
Copyright © 2002 by David Kaplan.
1. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing claims involving multiple par-
ties, “when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action” the court “may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” and “any
order . . . [that] adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties.” FED. R. CIV. P.
54(b). Such an order is subject to revision at any time prior to the entry of final judgment adju-
dicating the remaining claims. Id. Objecting parties have thirty days to appeal the final, certified
order. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
2. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing dismissals and compromises in
class action suits, “[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the court directs.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). In considering approval
of the settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e), the court holds a “fairness hearing.” See Eichenholtz v.
Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that a district court “can endorse a settlement
only if it is ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable’” (quoting Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726
F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983))); In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1991)
(“The primary concern addressed by Rule 23(e) is the protection of class members whose rights
may not have been given adequate consideration during the settlement negotiations.”). A fair-
ness hearing may include consideration of the interests of third parties. Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at
482. Once a settlement is approved and certified, it serves as res judicata to all claims covered by
the agreement. Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 660 (2d Cir. 1982).
3. See infra Part III. For an example of a broad order, see infra note 109.
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000)).
5. Some courts reasoned that bar orders were unnecessary because settling parties could
achieve substantially the same result by private agreement, although other courts recognized the
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Though the majority of courts decided that judicial economy and the
federal policy of encouraging settlement merited the entry of a set-
tlement bar order,6 these courts carefully scrutinized the scope of the
requested orders.7 The PSLRA codified an emerging norm by re-
quiring the entry of an order barring contribution claims made by or
“integral” role bar orders played in assuring finality and providing global peace to settling de-
fendants. Compare TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 923–24 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding in a pre-
PSLRA case that “[c]ourts . . . have no power to take away” the statutory right to contribution
despite the “‘overriding public interest’ in settlements” and declaring that “bar orders are not
necessary to partial settlements” (quoting Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th
Cir. 1989))), with In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 494 (11th Cir. 1992) ( “Modern class
action settlements increasingly incorporate settlement bar orders . . . . because they play an in-
tegral role in facilitating settlement.”), and Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1225–26. (“[S]ettling defendants
cannot obtain finality unless a ‘bar order’ is entered by the court.”). The Bendis court reasoned
that even if courts could assume the power to issue bar orders, bar orders “are not necessary to
partial settlements” because “the court and the plaintiff can protect settling defendants from
further exposure without a bar order,” 36 F.3d at 924, for example by plaintiff indemnification
and hold harmless agreements granted to settling defendants. Id.; see also Diane P. Carey, Note,
Rule 10b-5 Developments—Damages and Contribution, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 1017
(1982) (“One way parties may minimize the disincentive to settle that the right to contribution
creates is by including an indemnity provision in the settlement agreement.”). The Bendis court
reasoned that although sometimes the alternate arrangements “may add to the burden on
courts . . . . [t]his burdens the court no more than a proportional fault credit would” because
“most of the time the nonsettling defendants will have brought cross-claims for contribution”
that can be decided in the same trial. 36 F.3d at 924. The court concluded: “Whatever the added
burden, necessity cannot justify bar orders. They may be helpful, but they are not necessary.”
Id.
However, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that courts may have the power to issue bar orders
under the All Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” Id. at 925. Authority under the Act also includes
“enjoining further suits relitigating issues a court has already decided” and preventing collateral
attack of the court’s judgments. Id.
6. See In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 494 (identifying the sources of the court’s
power to enter a bar order as precedent and the federal policy of encouraging settlements); In re
Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160 (reasoning that defendants would never agree to a partial
settlement if the court does not protect them from further exposure by barring contribution and
similar claims); S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1431 (D.S.C. 1990) (“The reason to
adopt settlement bar rules is that they further both strong federal policies of encouraging set-
tlement, by insulating the settling defendant from further indeterminate liability, and the
spreading liability for violations of securities law among violators.” (citation omitted)); In re
Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (asserting that without a bar
order, “partial settlement of any federal securities case before trial is, as a practical matter, im-
possible”).
7. See, e.g., Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 554 (D. Colo. 1989) (con-
cluding that the court could bar nonsettling defendants’ claims for breach of warranty, breach of
contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, insofar as damages were “measured by” Secu-
rities or Exchange Act violations, but not where damages sought went “beyond” Securities or
Exchange Act liabilities).
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against certain settling parties in 10b-5 actions.8 Yet uncertainty arises
when the court is petitioned to enter an order of greater breadth than
the statutory model. Uncertainty remains, in part, because Congress
did not clarify its intent in requiring a contribution bar.9
Increasingly, settlement agreements stipulate effectiveness10 upon
the entry of a bar order containing specific provisions, which often
supplement those provided by the PSLRA.11 Yet, in considering
whether to approve a settlement, the court must consider the effect of
the settlement as a whole, and is not free to modify, substitute, or de-
lete the provisions of requested orders.12 In addition, courts generally
may not consider an appeal of a bar order separately from the entire
settlement.13
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7) (2000); see also infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
9. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5–6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683–84 (indi-
cating the major goals of the PSLRA but failing to mention why the contribution bar was in-
cluded); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 30–32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730–31 (same). In addressing congressional intent one district court concluded that “neither
House’s report indicates why the contribution bar was included.” In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.N.J. 2001). Furthermore, the court concluded that “review of tes-
timony at various congressional hearings fails to uncover any discussion which would shed light
on the specific purposes behind the contribution bar, beyond those apparent from the plain lan-
guage.” Id. at 17 n.1.
10. See Bendis, 36 F.3d at 923 (holding that the court can only agree to the judgment credit
method stipulated in the settlement agreement and that “if the court orders some other credit,
there is no settlement”).
11. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 725–33 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(considering settlements requiring the entry of settlement bars extending beyond contribution
claims); Neuberger v. Shapiro, 110 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382–83, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (same); Lucas v.
Hackett Assoc., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (same).
12. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir. 1992); see also In re Warner
Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that it is not the function of
the court to modify the terms of settlement as proposed by the parties); Cotton v. Hinton, 559
F.2d 1326, 1331–32 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the settlement must stand or fall as a whole); In
re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 257–
58 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that the court will not substitute its business judgment for that of the
parties, but will determine whether the proposed settlement is within a range of reasonable-
ness).
13. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 494–95 (holding that “[w]here the parties have
stipulated that the bar order is integral to the settlement, this court may not consider the order
in isolation” and that settling defendants may have waived their rights to object to the order).
However, should the court disapprove the settlement, it may notify the parties of the objection-
able provisions and instruct the parties what must be done to gain court approval. In re Cal.
Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 260 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Reid v. New York, 570 F. Supp.
1003, 1005–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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A provision augmenting the PSLRA bar, which is often sought
by settling parties, is a bar on all claims for indemnification.14 Prohib-
iting indemnification claims surpasses the PSLRA because, although
the PSLRA directs the court to bar certain claims for contribution,15
the Act is silent on indemnity. Undeterred, numerous courts have en-
tered orders barring claims for indemnification, reasoning that al-
though the PSLRA directs the court to bar contribution claims “in
the first instance,” the statute should not be read to foreclose the en-
try of a broader order.16 Courts note that neither the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act)17 nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act)18 provide indemnity rights, and federal precedent gener-
ally regards indemnification as inconsistent with the deterrent pur-
pose of the securities laws.19 Thus, a bar on indemnification claims is
proper.
Unsettled is whether bar orders may prohibit indemnification
claims made under state corporation law,20 as well as so-called “inde-
pendent” claims premised on, for example, tort or contract theories.21
If successful, “independent” claims would reallocate the liability of a
settlement (or judgment) to another party. Because the liability of a
settlement is a precondition to the “independent” claims (as the li-
14. See cases cited infra notes 42–71, 91–111 (referencing numerous cases involving re-
quests by settling parties for a bar on all claims seeking indemnification).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A) (2000).
16. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 726, 727 n.29; see also infra notes 61–
64 and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
19. See infra notes 47–50.
20. See infra Part II.B. For a discussion of corporate indemnification of officers and direc-
tors and the enforceability of indemnification bylaws, see generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI &
JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 4.12–4.18, (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997); PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS’ AND
OFFICERS’ LIABILITY (2001); see also R. Franklin Balotti et al., Recent Developments in Dela-
ware Corporate Law, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 57, 72–78 (2002) (discussing recent Delaware
state court decisions on indemnification and corporate bylaws providing for indemnification).
21. See infra Part III. Compare In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that in reaching a fair and equitable settlement, a district court may exercise its
discretion to bar interrelated claims), with In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585,
596 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[M]erely because [the issuer’s] tort and contract claims seek to recover
damages that could be recoverable in a state law indemnity action do not convert these claims
into impermissible indemnity claims under the federal securities laws.”), and In re Rite Aid
Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.33. (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that concerns over the
potential viability of independent state law claims should not inhibit the approval of an other-
wise acceptable bar order and that the “the issue of whether certain particular claims are cov-
ered by any bar order we issue is properly for another court to decide”).
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ability of a settlement establishes a completed tort claim or breach of
contract claim), allowing a party to raise state law claims premised on
the same facts underlying the settled federal securities action argua-
bly permits an end run around a settlement agreement and/or an in-
demnification bar.22 For this reason, a minority of courts refuses to
recognize independent claims, and instead regards independent
claims as “de facto claims for indemnification”23 and “nothing more
than claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in
wording.”24 Yet, the majority of courts have concluded that tort—or
contract—based claims are legally distinct from contribution and in-
demnity claims, because such claims require proof of specific ele-
ments, such as duty, breach, causation, etc.25
This Note outlines the scope of bar orders entered in federal se-
curities fraud settlements. After reviewing the PSLRA bar, this Note
analyzes the uncertain purview of an indemnification bar, before con-
sidering the courts’ contrasting treatment of independent claims. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes by suggesting that where satisfied securities
fraud liabilities are premised on a compensatory policy, both indem-
22. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting an
auditor’s argument that “an attempt to use state law claims to ‘shift the portion of the settle-
ment payment ultimately found to be attributable to a co-defendant . . . is an impermissible end-
run around the contribution bar statute’” (alteration in original)).
23. Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989); see
also infra Part III.A.
24. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 495–96.
25. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d at 5–10:
[T]he elements that [the company] must prove to prevail on its independent claims
are different from those it would have to prove on a contribution claim . . . . [The
company’s] state law claims . . . will require it to prove the specific elements related to
those claims, e.g., duty, breach, causation, etc . . . . [The independent] claims are
therefore fundamentally different from a claim for contribution.
(quoting Cendant Sur-Reply at 3–4); Michael R. Young, The Liability of Corporate Officials to
Their Outside Auditor for Financial Statement Fraud, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2155, 2155 (1996)
(studying the shift in perception over the past decade holding management increasingly respon-
sible for audited financial statements, “result[ing] in the increasing viability of independent
claims by auditors against the officers and directors of their client companies”); see also infra
Part III.B. Young states that this development is significant because “auditor[s] may recover
from corporate officials substantial damages in shareholder litigation, even damages the auditor
itself paid to settle shareholder claims” and because “the mere existence of auditor claims can
preclude corporate officials from settling a class action on their own, because the corporate offi-
cials, even after consummation of the settlement, may still be vulnerable to litigation from the
outside auditor.” Young, supra, at 2156. Thus auditors, the traditional “deep pocket,” can “vir-
tually preclude a settlement by anyone, no matter how much money corporate officials are
willing to pay.” Id.
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nification and independent claims may be recognized as being beyond
the reach of settlement bar orders.
I.  CONTRIBUTION AND THE REFORM ACT
Defendants of claims made under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act26 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder27 face joint and several
liability for their fraudulent acts if they knowingly commit28 a viola-
tion of the securities laws. Although the entire damage award can be
collected from one or more covered parties,29 the PSLRA expressly
provides contribution rights30 for these jointly and severally liable par-
ties paying more than their fair share of a judgment.31 A party’s fair
share of a judgment (as determined by the trier of fact) depends on
their percentage of responsibility relative to “each person against
whom a claim for contribution is made.”32
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A) (defining “knowing commission” as “an untrue statement
of a material fact, with actual knowledge that the representation is false” or an omission “to
state a fact necessary in order to make the statement made not misleading, with actual knowl-
edge that, as a result of the omission, one of the material representations of the covered person
is false”). Reckless conduct is not classified as a “knowing commission.” Id. § 78u-4(f)(10)(B).
Although the Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that sci-
enter or “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” is required for
liability under Rule 10b-5 to arise, the court reserved the question of whether recklessness
would suffice for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 194 n.12; see also Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 (1983) (“We have explicitly left open the
question of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.”). Since Hochfelder, every
federal circuit court that has addressed the issue has concluded that recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement. Tower C. Snow et al., Defending Securities Class Actions, 2 A.L.I. PROC.
789, 834–41 (2000) (listing federal circuit courts holding that recklessness satisfies scienter re-
quirement).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (“Any covered person against whom a final judgment is en-
tered in a private action shall be liable for damages jointly and severally only if the trier of fact
specifically determines that such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the securi-
ties laws.”).
30. Prior to Congress’s enactment of the PSLRA, the Supreme Court upheld an implied
cause of action for contribution under Section 10(b)(5). Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 286 (1993).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(8) (“A covered person who becomes jointly and severally liable
for damages in any private action may recover contribution from any other person who, if
joined in the original action, would have been liable for the same damages . . . .”).
32. Id.; see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
641, 851 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that although the PSLRA embraces a proportionate fault stan-
dard for contribution claims made by outside directors under certain sections of the Securities
Act and Exchange Act, “one can expect its influence” in actions under other provisions of the
securities laws, e.g., an officer’s or underwriter’s liability under section 11).
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Corollary to these express contribution rights, the PSLRA sets
forth a bar on contribution claims in 10b-5 actions that settle prior to
trial.33 In addition to discharging the settling party from all obligations
to the plaintiff arising out of the action, the PSLRA directs the court
to enter an order discharging the settling party from all claims for
contribution made by other parties.34 Furthermore, the PSLRA bar
has been held to prohibit claims for contribution made under other
sections of the federal securities laws where contribution rights oth-
erwise would exist.35 The bar is bilateral in prohibiting contribution
claims made against settling parties as well as contribution claims that
may otherwise belong to a settling party.36 The bar may extend to pre-
clude pendant state law contribution claims that are “integrally re-
lated”37 or “arise out of” the settled federal securities claims.38
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7):
A covered person who settles any private action at any time before final verdict or
judgment shall be discharged from all claims for contribution brought by other per-
sons. Upon entry of the settlement by the court, the court shall enter a bar order con-
stituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling covered
person arising out of the action . . . .
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A)(i) (declaring the order effective against all future claims for
contribution arising out of the action “by any person against the settling covered person”). The
PSLRA’s move to proportional responsibility (for most defendants) limits the practical effect of
the statutory bar, as the move to proportionate responsibility eliminates contribution rights oth-
erwise available to jointly and severally liable defendants paying more than their fair share.
35. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593 (D.N.J. 2001) (applying
section 21D(f)(7) to bar contribution actions otherwise permitted under section 11 of the 1933
Act). Cendant held that
[b]ecause the Court determines that the PSLRA bars all contribution claims that arise
out of the Section 10(b) action, it does not consider whether a finder of fact would be
able to allocate the settlement amounts between those that are attributable to Section
10(b) and those that resulted from Section 11 claims.
Id. The contribution bar also extinguishes implied rights of contribution available under Rule
10b-5 and other portions of the federal securities laws. See id. (“[Defendant’s] interpretation of
the plain language of the PSLRA is too narrow. By its language, the bar applies to prohibit all
future claims for contribution arising out of the action . . . .”).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A)(ii) (providing that the bar order was to be effective against
all future claims for contribution arising out of the action “by the settling covered person against
any person, other than a person whose liability has been extinguished by the settlement of the
settling covered person”).
37. E.g., Lucas v. Hackett Assoc., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
38. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 593. In Lucas, which preceded the
Cendant holding, the court specifically addressed only whether state law claims for contribution
are barred under section 21D(f)(7) of the PSLRA. 18 F. Supp. 2d at 534–35. However, the Cen-
dant court held that section 21(D(f)(7)’s language that “all future claims for contribution arising
out of the action” should be read broadly, and to the extent that a claim is “integrally related”
to the securities claim settled, all contribution claims that arise out of that action are barred. 139
F. Supp. 2d at 593. The court found that the parties did not dispute that a claim under section 11
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To eliminate prejudice that a joint and severally liable nonset-
tling defendant might incur as a result of having its contribution rights
eliminated,39 the PSLRA contains an offset providing that any judg-
ment subsequently obtained against nonsettling parties shall be re-
duced by the greater of (1) an amount corresponding to the settling
party’s percentage of responsibility, or (2) the dollar amount paid by
the settling party.40 Insofar as the offset is held to encompass pendant
state law claims, the PSLRA essentially codifies the single recovery
rule in 10b-5 actions.41
II.  INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
A. Indemnification Is Generally Prohibited under the Federal
Securities Laws
Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, court approval of securi-
ties fraud settlements frequently included orders barring indemnifica-
tion claims made by or against settling parties.42 The reasoning sup-
claim was integrally related to a section 10(b) claim, as the two claims “arise out of practically
the exact same factual environment and require nearly identical proofs.” Id. The court reasoned
that “(1) defendants’ Section 11 liability to plaintiffs would have been limited only to those
statements made in connection with a prospectus or registration statement and [that (2) Section
10(b)’s requirement that scienter be proved would] not prevent the claims from being “inte-
grally related.” Id.
39. For analysis regarding the equity of the proportionate fault/percentage of responsibility
judgment reduction method versus other methods previously employed before the PSLRA, see
Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1229–33 (9th Cir. 1989).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(B).
41. Where recovery is permitted on nonbarred, nonpreempted state law claims, a plaintiff
may be able to bypass the single recovery rule. A plaintiff may reap a windfall settlement as a
result of divergent setoff mechanisms governing state law claims, as judgment credits often need
to be figured differently with respect to state law claims. See, e.g., In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927
F.2d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Maryland Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act
governs judgments based on state law claims, and that the determination on the offset mecha-
nism for federal claims will be postponed until the time of entry of judgment “based on control-
ling legal principles in effect at that time”).
42. See, e.g., In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
“[m]odern class action settlements increasingly incorporate settlement bar orders” assuring set-
tling defendants protection “against codefendants’ efforts to shift their losses through cross-
claims for indemnity, contribution, and other causes related to the underlying litigation”).
Courts have entered bar orders eliminating both implied and contractual claims of indemnity.
See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 478 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming a bar order extin-
guishing all rights of indemnity against the settling corporation, even though the corporation
had agreed multiple times in four separate contracts to indemnify a nonsettling underwriter for
duties performed in relation to the public offering); Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1232 (disregarding a
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porting a bar on indemnification was straightforward: indemnification
is generally43 not permitted under the federal securities laws.44 There
nonsettling defendant underwriter’s argument that a bar order impermissibly infringed its con-
tractual indemnification rights because such clauses are invalid as violative of federal policy).
43. Scattered opinions occasionally permit, or suggest that indemnification may be avail-
able, where one tortfeasor is guilty of negligence and another acted with scienter (e.g., a section
11 tortfeasor seeking indemnification from a Rule 10b-5 tortfeasor). See, e.g., Adalman v.
Baker, Watts & Co., 599 F. Supp. 752, 759 (D. Md. 1984); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391
F. Supp. 935, 938–39 (E.D. Pa. 1975). One court has permitted indemnification of 10b-5 liability
where a settling party neither admitted fault nor was determined to have acted with scienter by
the trier of fact, and where the party avoided pleading itself as a “joint tortfeasor” entitled to
contribution. Fromer v. Yogel, 50 F. Supp. 2d 227, 237–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding an implied
cause of action for indemnity under section 10b-5 where the ability to determine the indemni-
tee’s fault was foreclosed); see also Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 863, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (declaring that the characterization that indemnity is not available as a matter
of law “is overbroad” and noting that it is most relevant “‘whether the defendant acted with ac-
tual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth’” and “whether a party is personally
at fault, actually contributed to an injury, incurred merely vicarious or imputed liability, or had
actual knowledge of alleged material misstatements” (quoting Odette v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975))); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist.,
491 F. Supp. 1364, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (rejecting indemnity for intentional misconduct, but
suggesting that its holding would have been different had liability been premised on negligence).
In Fromer, the court maintained that the Second Circuit in Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), “suggested” that indemnity claims could proceed under the
Exchange Act where the wrong committed by the indemnitee “is no greater than ordinary neg-
ligence.” See 50 F. Supp. 2d at 238 n.8 (declaring that the Second Circuit had not adopted the
view of other circuits that indemnification is “simply unavailable under the federal securities
laws” and had dismissed such cases on the grounds that there the parties “all shared fault to
some extent”). Perhaps noting the court’s departure from federal precedent in finding an im-
plied cause of action for indemnity under the federal securities laws, Judge Scheindlin reasoned
that the combination of (1) the Supreme Court’s holding in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Em-
ployers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993), that federal courts have authority to imply a right to contribu-
tion under section 10b-5, and (2) Congress’s recognition of the judiciary’s “authority to shape,
within limits, the 10b-5 cause of action,” provided the necessary authority to imply a cause of
action for indemnity under Section 10b-5. See id. at 238–39 (stating that because “the 10b-5 ac-
tion was not created by Congress, but was implied by the judiciary . . . . it would be unfair to
those against whom damages have been assessed for the courts to now disavow authority to al-
locate that liability on the theory that Congress has not addressed the issue directly”); see also
id. at 238 (noting that “a judicial finding of liability” was precluded because the original action
had settled and the statute of limitations on related actions had run, leaving an admission as the
only manner on which to base a finding of liability, thus “‘[p]laintiffs are entitled to an opportu-
nity to prove that they were without fault and are therefore entitled to indemnity’ under federal
securities laws”) (quoting Greenwald v. Am. Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
Indemnity between Securities Act violators is rare. Whether an issuer may obtain indem-
nification from Section 11 liabilities arising from either (1) an underwriter’s or dealer’s fraud
(e.g., “spinning” and “laddering”), or (2) the allocation of shares in an IPO and aftermarket tie-
in agreements, should be regarded as an open area of law. Compare In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 740 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that “[t]hose courts that have permitted
indemnification have done so only if the party to which the loss is shifted is one ‘significantly
more liable for the injury to the plaintiff’ but declining to reach whether a party “may ever” be
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is no statutory right to indemnification under either the Securities Act
or Exchange Act,45 and courts almost46 unanimously refuse to read
implied indemnity rights into either Act because “[p]ermitting in-
demnity would undermine the statutory purpose of assuring diligent
performance of duty and deterring negligence.”47 Courts refuse to en-
force indemnification agreements because “to tolerate indemnity . . .
would encourage flouting the policy of the common law and the Secu-
rities Act,”48 as indemnification agreements allow a party to shift its
entire liability to another before allegations of wrongdoing surface
and a determination of fault is made, undermining the federal policy
of full disclosure and Congress’s intent to protect the public (particu-
larly unsophisticated investors) from fraudulent practices.49 Courts
indemnified for negligent violations of section 11(quoting Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 599
F. Supp. 752, 755 (D.Md. 1984))) and In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1078
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to rule on indemnification of negligent violations of the Securi-
ties Act but noting that “[t]here is some support” for the position that indemnification is per-
missible for negligent violators), and Adalman 599 F. Supp. at 754–55, aff’d in part and rev’d in
part, 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to rule out the indemnification of a party not actively
engaged in any wrongdoing under Section 12(a) or elsewhere where liability attaches as a mat-
ter of law, and holding that a summary judgment determination on the enforceability of an in-
demnity agreement must await the determination of relative culpability), with Odette v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that because
indemnification for even negligent violations offends the deterrent policy of the securities laws,
as the purpose of the 1933 Act is regulatory rather than compensatory, “‘the question of who
pays the damages to the plaintiffs is of as great concern as the issue of whether the plaintiffs are
to be compensated at all’” (quoting Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D.
Del. 1974)), and Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 43, 44–45 (N.Y.
1973) (considering indemnity from alleged violations of Rule 14a-9, the fraud provision of the
proxy rules that imposes a negligence standard)).
44. See, e.g., Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 483 (“[T]here is no express right to indemnification
under the 1933 or 1934 Acts. . . . [and] there is no implied right to seek indemnification under
the federal securities laws. . . . Indemnification claims are not cognizable under the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934.”); Laventhol, Krekstein, Howath & Howath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672,
676 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[P]ermitting indemnity would undermine the statutory purpose of assuring
diligent performance of duty and deterring negligence.”).
45. In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also
Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Serv., 641 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The 1933 and 1934 Securi-
ties Acts ‘do not provide anywhere for indemnification under any circumstances.’” (quoting
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (1979))). Indemnification rights are not mentioned in
the legislative histories of either the Securities or Exchange Acts. See supra note 9.
46. See supra note 43.
47. Laventhol, 637 F.2d at 676.
48. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288.
49. See Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 485 (stating that allowing “non-settling defendants to avoid
secondary or derivative liability ‘merely by showing ignorance . . . would contravene the con-
gressional intent to protect the public, particularly unsophisticated investors, from fraudulent
practices’” (quoting In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. at 613)).
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have held that indemnity from federal securities law liabilities is un-
available as matter of law,50 such that indemnification is prohibited
both without regard to a party’s degree of fault51 and at times even
where a party’s conduct is wholly without fault.52
However, an alternative to an absolute prohibition on indemnity
is to permit indemnification from liabilities incurred in connection
with a statute’s compensatory purpose.53 Insofar as section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act is applied to compensate defrauded investors,54 pri-
50. E.g., In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. at 622 (dismissing indemnity
claims because (1) customer agreements can allow for indemnification of federal securities law
liabilities only to the extent of implied indemnity rights, (2) there are no implied indemnity
rights under the federal securities laws, and (3) parties cannot contractually create or expand a
right to indemnity under the federal securities laws where none exists).
51. See Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 484–85 (noting that “[a] number of federal courts have held
that this policy against allowing indemnification extends to violations of sections 11 and 12(2),
where the underwriter is merely negligent in the performance of its duties”); Baker, 876 F.2d
1101 at 1108 (declaring that “Congress has not provided a right to indemnification in the federal
securities law under any circumstances”).
52. King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1282 (7th Cir. 1989). But see supra note 43.
53. Perhaps this distinction has been contemplated in the Southern District of New York
where courts have been careful to focus on section 10b-5’s scienter requirement, rather than
prohibiting indemnity broadly on deterrence grounds. In re Livent Sec. Litig., 193 F. Supp. 2d
750, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 2002):
With respect to defendants’ claims of indemnification, the Court concurs with the
long line of cases which hold that a defendant in a securities fraud action is prohibited
from availing himself of indemnification . . . . [T]he Second Circuit has held that “it is
well established that one cannot insure himself against his own reckless, willful or
criminal misconduct.”
(quoting Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288) (emphasis added); Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Natwest Fin., Inc.,
137 F. Supp. 2d 251, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“‘[B]ecause indemnity is unavailable to a party who
has himself recklessly or intentionally contributed to a plaintiff’s injury, and because . . . § 10(b)
liability require[s] a finding of intent or scienter, [defendants] are precluded from seeking in-
demnification in [that] action.’” (quoting Academic Indus., Inc. v. Untermeyer Mace Partners,
Ltd., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3953, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1992) (emphasis added)); see also
supra note 43; cf. Burda Media, Inc. v. Blumenberg 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9240, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1999):
While this requirement that the indemnitee be without fault may not demand that
party to be absolutely blameless in all respects . . . the liberal availability of contribu-
tion and apportionment today counsels in favor of a rule precluding indemnification
where the third-party plaintiff is partially at fault for the same legal injury as that vis-
ited upon plaintiff by the proposed indemnitor, or unless ‘the disparity of relative fault
has been so great that it renders the party seeking indemnification essentially innocent
of the wrong committed.
(quoting Dep’t. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 930 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)) (emphasis added).
54. The Supreme Court has stressed that Section 10(b) should be applied consistent with its
remedial purpose. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983) (re-
peating the Court’s maxim that Section 10(b) “should be construed not technically and restric-
tively, but flexibly to effectuate [its] remedial purposes”) (marks and citations omitted). Distill-
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vate or equitable reallocation of 10b-5 liability may not offend reme-
dial policy so long as an investor class is made whole. In contrast,
where a statute’s underlying policy is deterrence, indemnity offends.
For instance, the Securities Act’s registration process endows various
participants with select duties each inuring to the benefit of the in-
vesting public.55 Allowing a party to absolve itself of liability through
private ordering undermines the Securities Act’s design. Failing to
recognize the disparate policies, courts have blurred the underlying
policy of the Securities Act with sections of the Exchange Act into an
overarching scheme that operates to prohibit indemnification of any
securities fraud liability under the broad umbrella of the federal secu-
rities laws.56 Since the PSLRA’s enactment, courts have continued to
issue settlement bar orders extinguishing all indemnity claims.57
ing Congress’ purpose in enacting Section 10(b) has proved illusive. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-02 (1976) (“[T]he extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is
bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent.”); see also Thel, The Original Conception
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394 (1990) (criticizing the
Court’s interpretation of Section 10(b) and stating that “[t]he fundamental problem is that while
the Exchange Act was under consideration, there was very little debate over section 10(b) and
no substantial opposition to it,” because “the Exchange Act was not the product of normal cir-
cumstances”). The broad remedial policy of Section 10(b) may be served differently depending
upon the identity of the party and the nature of relief sought; thus, although the Court held that
scienter is an essential element of a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation regardless of
whether the suit is a private action for damages or an injunction enforcement action brought by
the SEC, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980), the Court also noted that the Second Cir-
cuit’s reasoning highlights the compensatory function of Section 10(b) in private actions: “the
two types of suits under § 10 (b) advance different goals: actions for damages are designed to
provide compensation to individual investors, whereas suits for injunctive relief serve to provide
maximum protection for the investing public.” Id. at 686 n.3.
55. See Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 (“Civil liability under section 11 and similar provisions
was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement
of the Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those who fail in their duties.” (ci-
tations omitted)); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(observing that “[i]ndemnification must also be denied to encourage the reasonable care” re-
quired by the regulatory purpose of § 12(2)); Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163,
167–68 (D. Del. 1974) (“It is well established that the purpose of § 14(a) is regulatory, not com-
pensatory. . . . Thus, the question of who pays the damages to the plaintiffs is of as great concern
as the issue of whether the plaintiffs are compensated at all.” (citations omitted)).
56. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 485 n.12 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The overarch-
ing purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, and of the subsequent Exchange Act of 1934, was to
restore confidence in the market.” (quoting Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1989)); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 549 (D. Colo. 1989) (“[C]laims
for indemnification based on other sections [other than § 11 of the ‘33 Act or § 10(b)(5) of the
‘34 Act] of either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, have been rejected uniformly as con-
trary to the regulatory nature of the federal securities laws.” (citations omitted)).
57. See infra notes 58–64, 108–11, and accompanying text.
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Parties objecting to indemnity bars have argued that post-
PSLRA bar orders should be limited to the specific provisions of the
Act.58 Because the PSLRA sets forth a particular contribution bar,
parties have argued that by omission the Act precludes settlement or-
ders from barring indemnification claims.59 This argument was re-
jected by the court in In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation,60 which
held that the PSLRA does not “implicitly adopt” prohibitions that
preclude a court from entering an order barring indemnification
claims.61 The court reasoned that no provision in the Act explicitly
limits a court’s ability to enter an order barring indemnification, and
nowhere states that “the order therein described” is the solitary order
that courts may entertain.62 Moreover, the PSLRA was enacted
against “a background of prior decisional law under which orders bar-
ring indemnification claims had been entered,” a history that “mili-
tates against a finding that the PSLRA could implicitly adopt a prohi-
bition of the practice.”63
58. See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Grass
and Bergonzi contend first that the language of the PSLRA demonstrates that the only permis-
sible bar order provision is that specifically delineated in the Act . . . .”).
59. See id. (“Conversely, Grass and Bergonzi maintain, the PSLRA does not sanction, and
in fact by omission prohibits, the entry [of a broader order] . . . .”). Although the objecting par-
ties noted that during the debate over the PSLRA Representative Fields remarked that a cer-
tain amendment, ultimately approved, prevented courts from entering orders barring indemnity,
the court found that the Act’s legislative history did not support a reading of § 4(f)(7)(A) be-
yond its explicit terms. Id. at 726; see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
n.1 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[T]his court’s own review of testimony at various congressional hearings
fails to uncover any discussion which would shed light on the specific purposes behind the con-
tribution bar, beyond those apparent from the plain language.”)
60. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 726–27.
61. Id. at 727.
62. Id. at 726. In holding that the PSLRA does not specify the sole bar order available in
securities fraud settlements, the court was careful to emphasize that its decision in no way “ex-
tended” the provisions of section 78u-4:
[T]he PSLRA does not identify a single particular mode of bar order, but instead
merely directs the court to bar certain contribution claims. We do not read § 78u-4 as
attempting exhaustively to detail each and every action that a district court is permit-
ted to perform in conjunction with a securities action settlement and thereby to forbid
all other actions.
. . . [O]ur holding does not serve to ‘extend’ the PSLRA in the first instance. Rather,
while we do read the PSLRA as positively requiring one form of release—namely, the
bar on contribution actions—we do not see this as constituting language that ‘limits’
the nature of the bar order to only that form.
Id. at 727 n.29.
63. Id. at 727. Although the court declined to approve the settlement because a certain pro-
tective offset provision contained in the settlement agreement was omitted from the proposed
order and the agreement lacked a reciprocity provision barring the released tortfeasors from
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Other courts considering the issue have similarly refused to in-
terpret the PSLRA as limiting a court’s discretion to enter a broad
order.64 Yet, where parties stipulate to a settlement containing a bar
order only to the extent required by law, the PSLRA simply requires
a contribution bar.65 In such circumstances, the PSLRA bar has been
interpreted to preempt state law claims styled as contribution claims,
but no more.66
B. Preemption of State Law Indemnity Claims
Courts have held that under an order barring indemnification
claims, state law indemnification claims that are coextensive with set-
tled federal securities law claims are preempted as a matter of law.67
Preempted state law actions may stand “as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”68 although
it is “well settled that federal law does not enjoy complete preemptive
instituting actions against the nonsettling defendants, the court eagerly extended Eichenholtz to
post-PSLRA actions. See id. at 729–30 (stating that the language of the bar order in question “is
materially identical to the provisions approved in Eichenholtz”). The court’s reasoning was clear
on its face: because the provisions of the PSLRA in no way effect an indemnity-preclusion
analysis, the “indisputable breadth” of Eichenholtz is undiminished by the PSLRA. Id. at 727–
28.
64. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273, 284 (D.N.J. 2000) (overruling a
derivative intervenor’s objection that a class action settlement was an illegal indemnification of
its officers and holding that “[a]lthough Eichenholtz permits a court to approve a settlement
which contains a bar to indemnification, it does not require the imposition of such a bar”); Lu-
cas v. Hackett Assocs., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535–36 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (explaining that because
indemnification is forbidden under federal precedent, it is only logical that in enacting the
PSLRA, Congress failed to expressly provide for a bar on indemnification claims).
65. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that
previous cases interpreting the PSLRA settlement bar allowed for more comprehensive orders,
but in cases in which parties sought the entry of a bar only to the extent required by the PSLRA,
only claims styled as contribution claims were automatically barred).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Neuberger v. Shapiro, 110 F. Supp. 2d 373, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“Inasmuch as
those cross-claims arise out of the [Shapiro] defendants’ alleged liability under the securities
laws, they are pre-empted and, therefore barred as a matter of law.” (citing Lucas, 18 F. Supp.
2d at 537)); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Patriot’s Point Dev. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 880, 882 n.2
(D.S.C. 1992) (“[T]he federal policy of deterrence that prohibits indemnity for violation of fed-
eral securities laws may also bar state law claims of indemnity where the primary liability is
measured by the federal securities violations.” (citing Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F.
Supp. 540, 554 (D. Colo. 1989))); Alvarado Partners, 723 F. Supp. at 551–52 (holding that a fed-
eral settlement bar order extinguishing indemnification claims may preempt any state claim for
indemnity that is coextensive with a federal indemnification claim because of overriding federal
concerns). But see infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
68. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
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force in the field of securities.”69 Thus, some courts have held that
state law governs the availability of indemnity under pendent claims,70
so long as such claims are not “de facto federal securities claims.”71
An ambiguity in the field of preemption may involve the en-
forceability of director and officer (D&O) indemnification agree-
69. Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 507, 512 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, many
states have enacted settlement bar provisions that may bar indemnification actions in their own
right. See Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1329 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (citing twenty-three
different state statutes). Under most settlement bar statutes, if a judgment is later entered
against the nonsettling defendants, nonsettling defendants are entitled to an offset against the
judgment in an amount proportionate to the amount of the settlement. See 3 HERBERT
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12.43, at 99 (3d ed. 1992) (“These [settlement bar]
statutes permit settling defendants to escape cross- and third-party claims for contribution by
granting nonsettling joint tortfeasor codefendants some form of offset rights in any future judg-
ment by the settling plaintiffs against them.”). State statutes providing their own settlement bar
provisions may or may not overlap with federal common law policy on indemnification. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (Supp. 2002) (providing that a good faith determination
“shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative in-
demnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault” (emphasis added)); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW. § 15-108 (2001) (defining “good faith” as the absence of collusion or other indicia
of bad faith such that the nonsettling defendant pays no more than its equitable share of dam-
ages by permitting reduction of any judgment entered against the nonsettling defendant by the
greater of the amount of the settlement or by the amount of the settling defendant’s equitable
share).
70. E.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding, in a case in which the parties “d[id] not dispute that state law govern[ed] the
common law counts pendent to the federal securities claims” the appellants’ state claims for in-
demnity based upon negligent failure to investigate and discover fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty could be recognized depending on which state’s law was to be applied and the resolution of
unresolved factual issues as to the relationship between the parties).
71. See Lucas v. Hackett Assocs., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535–36 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that
indemnity is not available for federal securities claims or for state law claims which seek “dam-
ages for what are essentially violations of the federal securities laws” but allowing indemnity for
state claims which are not “de facto federal securities claims” to be determined by the state
court); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (permitting nonsettling
defendants to pursue indemnity claims premised on state law against settling defendant). The
Lucas court denied approval of the settlement in part because the settlement order stated that it
would bar all indemnity claims, included those premised on nonsecurities state law claims. 18 F.
Supp. 2d at 534–36. However, the court reiterated: “[T]o the extent that [a defendant] intends to
seek indemnification premised on violations of federal securities laws—whether those violations
are clothed as state law tort claims or federal law securities claims—[a defendant] may not seek
indemnity because such claims are preempted . . . .” Id. at 535–36 (citing Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)). The court held that “[i]f, on the other
hand, plaintiffs [sic] state law claims are sufficiently independent of the federal securities
claims—although admittedly related to them as they ‘arise out of’ the federal claims—this Court
will not bar [the defendant’s] right to seek indemnity under state law.” Id. The result in Lucas
was that the court refused to enter the proposed bar order because it assumed that “at least one
claim for indemnity” may be pursued that would not be based on federal securities law. Id.
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ments.72 Bylaws providing for D&O indemnification and/or exculpa-
tion are usually authorized (or required) to a limited extent under
state corporation law.73 Federal courts have generally permitted in-
demnification of officers and directors who successfully defend, or
admit no fault in settling, securities fraud claims.74 The Securities and
Exchange Commission has noted its support for indemnification of
outside directors under these circumstances as well.75 Yet, the cloud of
72. See supra note 20 (listing sources that discuss the tension between corporate indemnifi-
cation bylaws and the federal policy prohibiting indemnity from securities law liabilities). Set-
tling officer-directors who are protected by indemnification/exculpation clauses may attempt to
carve out an exclusion to an order barring indemnification claims. When officers and/or direc-
tors are nonsettling parties, the scope of an indemnity bar would be of great concern. In such
situations, courts must determine whether the federal common law policy barring indemnifica-
tion preempts state corporation law. See infra notes 67, 74.
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001) (permitting and, in some instances, re-
quiring Delaware corporations to indemnify directors, officers, and others for expenses incurred
in a wide variety of legal proceedings).
Section 145(c) of Delaware’s code provides that a corporation must indemnify directors
and officers who have been successful on the merits or otherwise in any defense of an action
covered by section 145(a) or 145(b). Under section 145 (a) and 145(b), a corporation may in-
demnify its directors (including officers, employees, and agents) for attorneys’ fees and other
expenses that arose in connection with their capacity as directors (if their conduct was in good
faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation), and for
judgments rendered against directors, or amounts paid in settlement of civil cases in third-party
actions by directors. Section 145(f) permits a corporation to provide broader indemnification
rights than those set forth in section 145, unless those rights are contrary to the limitations set
forth in section 145, other statutes, court decisions, or public policy.
74. See Koch Indus. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that an account-
ing firm that successfully defended a securities action was entitled to indemnification for litiga-
tion expenses under the charter provision of a corporate issuer); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,
109 F. Supp. 2d 273, 284 (D.N.J. 2000) (affirming, under an order barring only contribution ac-
tions, the propriety of corporate indemnification of individual directors for settlement payments
and defense costs where the defendants did not admit liability in settling the underlying suit and
the indemnification complies with applicable state law); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Richards, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5359, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 1996) (holding that a cor-
porate bylaw indemnifying officers and directors for settlement payments and defense costs was
not preempted by federal securities laws because the director acted in good faith); Raychem
Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (allowing corporate indemni-
fication of individual directors under Delaware law and holding that federal law does not pre-
empt state indemnification law where the defendants did not admit liability in settling the un-
derlying suit); Greenwald v. Am. Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating
that although under Delaware law “no party who has himself knowingly and willfully [sic] vio-
lated the federal securities laws may obtain indemnity from another violator of those laws,” a
party must have the opportunity to show whether he was at fault). But see, e.g., In re Cont’l.
Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (questioning the enforceability of a D&O indemnity
agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding and reversing the district court’s injunction of share-
holder lawsuits against certain directors and officers).
75. See, e.g., In Re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 447 (S.D. Ohio 1984):
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a settlement bar order prohibiting indemnification claims may ob-
scure the enforceability of D&O indemnification agreements. As
Judge Posner once remarked, “the federal common law” policy de-
termining the liabilities inter se of violators of the federal securities
laws “would seem” to have negative implications for the merits of
state claims in state actions.76 And although courts enforcing D&O
indemnification agreements normally limit preemption to instances
where a director’s or officer’s wrongdoing is admitted or “has been
plainly adjudicated,”77 this exception to the federal policy has not al-
ways been afforded to lower corporate officials.78 Such inconsistency
emphasizes a need to revisit the federal “prohibition” on indemnity.
A second and more nuanced split in the federal policy on indem-
nification was created by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Baker, Watts
& Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge.79 In Baker, the court dismissed with
prejudice a plaintiff’s state law statutory indemnification claim as
In the Commission’s view, outside directors provide important protections for public
investors in corporations generally and particularly where companies are financially
troubled. Indemnification for costs incurred in the defense of the good faith exercise
of their business judgment is an appropriate and necessary expense in order to attract
qualified persons to serve in that capacity.
Yet the SEC does not otherwise look favorably upon indemnity agreements. See generally
LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS, § 8:4 INDEMNIFICATION
AND CONTRIBUTION (3d ed. 2002):
[T]he Commission has long been dissatisfied with the idea that officers, directors, and
other persons controlling an issuer might be indemnified by the issuer for Securities
Act liability. The Commission’s position is that such indemnity is against public policy
and, therefore, it believes that any provision granting it is unenforceable.
See also id. § 4:2.2 DELAYING AND ACCELERATING EFFECTIVENESS (stating that the threat to
deny acceleration is the tool the Commission uses to enforce this viewpoint). Thus, when an is-
suer requests acceleration of a registration statement containing indemnity provisions, “the
Commission requires that the issuer include in its registration statement an undertaking to sub-
mit the public policy question concerning indemnification to a court test before paying any such
indemnity.” Id. § 4:2.2 DELAYING AND ACCELERATING EFFECTIVENESS (citing Regulation S-
K, item 512(h)). Even if acceleration is not requested, disclosure of the SEC’s position on in-
demnification must be included in the prospectus. Herbert S. Wander & James L. Jerue, Indem-
nification and Securities Litigation, in SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 121.04(1) n.3 (2002).
“The registrant must give up its discretion to indemnify a director, officer, or controlling person
absent a successful defense on his part.” Id. § 121.04(1).
76. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1982).
77. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5359, at *9 (citing
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989)).
78. King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1283 n.12 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that “[t]he only circuit
court case which did recognize a right to indemnification, explicitly did so under non-federal
law” and concluding that “there is no right to indemnification under the securities laws or fed-
eral common law”).
79. 876 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1989).
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preempted under federal law,80 but dismissed without prejudice the
plaintiff’s pendant common law actions for legal malpractice, negli-
gent misrepresentation, and breach of contract, leaving it up to the
state courts to classify whether these actions were preempted “de
facto claims for indemnification.”81 The Fourth Circuit did not define
what claims constitute “de facto” indemnity claims.82 This omission
caused a split regarding what state law claims constitute de facto in-
demnity claims, which claims are independently viable, and how the
assertion or potential assertion of independent claims affect the entry
of a broad settlement bar order.83
III.  “INDEPENDENT” CLAIMS
Federal courts have split on whether settlement bar orders may
extinguish state law causes of action—often based in tort or contract
law—that arise out of settled claims.84 Courts have expressed three
viewpoints. The first view holds that a broad order extinguishes all
claims made by or against settling parties that seek to recover the li-
ability of a settlement. Courts adopting this view reason that the inti-
mate relation of “independent” claims to the settled securities claims
transforms the “independent” claims into quasi-indemnification
and/or contribution actions.85 Thus, the claims may be barred.
The second (majority) view supports orders barring contribution
and indemnification, but holds independent claims of nonsettling par-
ties beyond the scope of settlement bar orders.86 Barring independent
claims is improper as independent claims require proof of different
elements and are fundamentally distinct from contribution and in-
demnification actions.87 Courts adopting this view sustain state law
80. Id. at 1108.
81. Id.; see also Lucas v. Hackett Assocs., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535–36 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(leaving the determination of which of the defendants’ potential claims for indemnification were
“de facto federal securities claims” to whichever state court would eventually hear the claims).
82. King, 876 F.2d at 1108.
83. See infra Part III.
84. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 496 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
“independent” fraud and negligence causes of actions are “nothing more than claims for contri-
bution or indemnification with a slight change in wording” (quoting S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Stone,
749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990)).
86. See infra Part III.B.
87. See supra note 25.
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claims raised subsequently by settling parties.88 Yet these courts some-
times disagree on whether independent claims may recover damages
that are “measured by” federal securities law liabilities.89
The third view holds that courts may approve settlements stipu-
lating to broad bar orders and refrain from issuing advisory opinions
on whether the order precludes potential independent claims.90 This
view permits the court to free itself of complex litigation via settle-
ment and avoid a contentious determination of how broadly the terms
of a bar order should be construed.
A. View #1: Independent Claims May Be Barred
The most widely cited decision supporting a bar on “independ-
ent” state law claims is the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in In re United
States Oil and Gas Litigation.91 There, a third-party plaintiff insurance
company sought damages against a broker and another settling de-
fendant on fraud and negligence theories92 “to the extent that it [was]
liable to any of the plaintiffs [(i.e., the court appointed receiver and
investor class)] herein.”93 The court held a settlement bar order94 ef-
fective against the “independent” causes of action, declaring that the
fraud and negligence claims were “nothing more than claims for con-
tribution or indemnification with a slight change in wording.”95 The
court stated there was “not a shred of logic upon which we could base
88. See, e.g., infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text; see also Young, supra note 25, at
2179–80:
The problem is that [settlement bar orders], upon which the corporate officials would
rely for global peace, may not properly preclude noncontribution or nonindemnifica-
tion claims. . . . [I]ndependent auditor claims, to the extent they exist, may proceed
against the settling corporate officials unimpeded. The corporate officials, thinking
they have bought global peace by striking a deal with shareholders, can find them-
selves brought right back into the litigation by the auditor.
89. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
90. See infra Part III.C.
91. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 491, 495–96.
93. Id. at 496.
94. The bar order provided:
All claims, however denominated, regardless of the allegations, fact, law, theories, or
principles on which they are based, including but not limited to claims for contribu-
tion or indemnity against the settling defendants by any individual corporation . . . or
other type of entity, including, but not limited to any party to this litigation, which
claims now exist or have accrued or in the future may exist or accrue . . . are extin-
guished, discharged, satisfied, and/or otherwise unenforceable.
Id. at 493 n.2.
95. Id. at 496 (citing S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990)).
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a principled distinction between bar orders against contribution, on
the one hand, and orders against indemnity or so-called ‘independent
claims,’ on the other.”96 The court reasoned that
[t]he propriety of the settlement bar order should turn upon the in-
terrelatedness of the claims that it precludes, not upon the labels
which parties attach to those claims. If the cross-claims that the dis-
trict court seeks to extinguish through the entry of a bar order arise
out of the same facts as those underlying the litigation, then the dis-
trict court may exercise its discretion to bar such claims in reaching a
fair and equitable settlement.97
The court stated that the dispute was not “one of those rare instances
where a cross-claim unrelated to defendants’ liability to the plaintiffs
has somehow remained.”98 Moreover, the court questioned “whether
truly independent claims that a settlement bar order cannot extin-
guish will ever remain in a class action lawsuit.”99
The Eleventh Circuit quoted a flowery opinion from the District
of South Carolina100 where nonsettling defendants were viewed as
having cloaked indemnification claims in fraud and contract parlance,
prompting that court to opine, “a rose by any other name is still a
rose.”101 The South Carolina National Bank102 court rejected nonset-
96. Id. at 495. This aspect of the holding was explicitly rejected by the courts in Lucas and
Cendant. Lucas held that although it had not reached the merits of the claims for indemnity as
did the Court in U.S. Oil and Gas, “[t]o the extent . . . that In re Oil and Gas may be read as
standing for the proposition that there generally is ‘no principled distinction’ between claims for
contribution and claims for indemnity, the Court disagrees and rejects its holding.” Lucas v.
Hackett Assoc., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.N.J. 2001) (“And this Court has already rejected the conclusion
of Oil & Gas that there is really no distinction between a contribution claim and one which
seeks recovery under a different theory . . . .”).
97. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d. at 496.
98. Id. at 496 n.5.
99. Id.
100. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990) (citing Greene v. Emersons,
[1983–1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99,582, at 97,271 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
1983).
101. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 496 (citing S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Stone, 749 F.
Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990)). The “rose by any other name is still a rose” metaphor first
originated in a different decision that also rejected the validity of independent claims under a
comprehensive settlement bar. In Greene v. Emersons, the independent cross-claims by a de-
fendant accounting firm against two individual corporate defendants were for fraud, conspiracy
to violate legal rights, and interference with business relations including inducing breach of con-
tract. [1983–1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99,528, at 97,271 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
1, 1983). The court held that if the independent claims were construed as indemnification claims
“the cross-claims must be dismissed” because “[n]o action for indemnity exists between partici-
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tling defendants’ objections that a proposed bar order103 improperly
prohibited their intended cross-claims for breach of contract, negli-
gence, and fraud,104 in a settlement of alleged 10b-5 violations, viola-
tions of South Carolina’s securities laws, and various common law
theories.105 The South Carolina Nat’l Bank court reasoned that be-
cause damages would arise only if the nonsettling defendants were
found liable to the plaintiffs, “these purported causes of action are
nothing more than claims for contribution or indemnification with a
slight change in wording.”106 The court added that as an equitable
remedy, claims for contribution entail no right to a jury trial, and as
for the indemnification claims, “as the Court has previously noted,
claims for indemnification as between co-tortfeasors are not cogniza-
ble under Rule 10b-5 or common law.”107
More recently, Neuberger v. Shapiro108 entered a broad bar or-
der109 over the objections of nonsettling defendants, who argued that
pants in a fraudulent scheme prohibited by the federal securities laws.” Id. at 97,271. The court
declared that “stripped of labels, verbiage, and conclusory allegations” the “independent”
claims were “no more than efforts to cast upon [the individual corporate defendants] the entire
ultimate responsibility for the damages alleged by plaintiffs,” although had the claims asserted
“independent damage . . . . of a different nature” that the accountant had suffered directly, the
court implicated that an independent claim might exist. Id. at 97,272 (noting that because the
accountant failed to plead damage apart from the settlement, “I am not in a position to deter-
mine whether or not [the accounting firm] is actually in a position to assert provable damages
separate and apart from its potential liability to the plaintiffs”). The court rejected the account-
ant’s attempt to substitute litigation costs and related inconveniences, citing the American Rule
on fee shifting. Id. For a detailed critique of Greene and an analysis of the viability of independ-
ent auditor cross-claims, see generally Young, supra note 25.
102. 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990). For an analysis of the “fine overview of settle-
ment issues” presented in South Carolina National Bank, see Snow et al., supra note 28, at 999.
103. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 749 F. Supp. at 1423 (barring all cross-claims made by nonsettling de-
fendants arising out of the settled claims).
104. Id. at 1432–33.
105. Id. at 1422.
106. Id. at 1433; see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Patriot’s Point Dev. Auth., 788 F. Supp.
880, 881 n.1 (D.S.C. 1992):
The Non-Settling Defendants in general . . . contend that they have ‘independent
claims’ against the [settling defendant] which are neither for contribution or indemni-
fication. It appears to this court that without plaintiffs suing the non-settling defen-
dants the ‘independent claims’ of the Non-Settling Defendants would not exist and
that these claims are really nothing more than claims for indemnity.
107. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 749 F. Supp. at 1433. The court added that should it be determined
that defendants are entitled to a jury trial, the proposed bar order would not infringe on that
right because it directed the Court to determine judgment reduction methods “in accordance
with principles of law, and equity and procedures then applicable” which would necessarily in-
clude a jury trial, if proper. Id.
108. 110 F. Supp. 2d 373 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
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the order impermissibly barred future state law claims.110 The court in
Neuberger reached the potential state law claims and rejected them as
untenable on numerous grounds, including preemption.111
B. View #2: Independent Claims May Not Be Barred
A second view holds that independent claims are based upon
separate wrongs, so that they survive settlement orders extinguishing
contribution and indemnification rights.112 The leading case, Cenco
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,113 is more commonly known for estab-
lishing the “imputation” doctrine.114 Yet Cenco also held that a code-
fendant auditor could state a cross-claim, distinct from an indemnity
109. The bar order provided in pertinent part:
All parties to the Litigation are permanently and forever barred and enjoined from
filing, commencing, instituting, prosecuting or maintaining, either directly, indirectly,
representatively, or in any other capacity, any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, third-
party claim or other action arising out of the Settled Claims and/or the transactions
and occurrences referred to in the Plaintiffs’ Complaints (including, without limita-
tion, any claim or action seeking indemnification and/or contribution, however de-
nominated) against [the settling defendant accounting firm] or any of the Released
Parties, whether such claims are legal or equitable, known or unknown, foreseen or
unforeseen, matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued.
Id. at 381.
110. Id. at 383.
111. Id. at 383–84 (“Inasmuch as those cross-claims arise out of the . . . defendants’ alleged
liability under the securities laws, they are pre-empted and, therefore barred as a matter of
law.”). The various other grounds on which the court relied in rejecting the nonsettling defen-
dants potential claims were: (1) as part of the settlement, the plaintiffs had agreed to indemnify
the released parties for any judgment that the nonsettling defendants obtained against the re-
leased parties, a provision the court found protected the nonsettling defendants, id. at 382–83;
(2) because of certain set-off provisions and indemnity agreements contained in the bar order,
any recovery on independent grounds “would be duplicative,” id. at 384; (3) in their individual
capacities the defendant directors and officers possessed no breach of contract action against
the accounting firm, id. at 383–84; (4) claims for professional negligence were dismissed because
under Pennsylvania law, “any claim . . . for substandard performance . . . is in reality a claim for
indemnification or contribution,” id. at 384.
112. Courts recognizing a distinction between independent claims and indemnification
and/or contribution claims have either permitted independent claims to proceed notwithstand-
ing comprehensive bar orders, or have expressly excluded independent claims from the order’s
ambit. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 730–31 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that the nonsettling defendant CEO’s separation claims and the CEO’s and CFO’s
defamation claims were clearly beyond the scope of the order); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 793 F.
Supp. 1306, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that an auditor’s independent state law tort and con-
tract claims, along with cross-claims by other parties, could continue to be prosecuted against a
settling law firm as they were left unaffected by the bar order).
113. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 454–56 (holding that a wrongdoing corporation whose senior management has
engineered a fraud may not assert justifiable reliance on an otherwise innocent outside auditor
who failed to discover and expose it).
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claim, against a corporation for the corporation’s fraud against the
auditor.115 In separating claims for common law fraud and breach of
contract from indemnity, Judge Posner considered “the distinction . . .
a fine one.”116 The codefendant auditor portrayed itself as a victim on
the state law theories rather than as a wrongdoer seeking indemnity.117
The court held that the existence of the settlement was relevant to the
auditor’s tort claim because it established impact: without the settle-
ment the alleged wrongdoing would be inchoate.118 Should the auditor
prove the codefendant issuer “defrauded it into issuing false audit re-
ports which in turn exposed it to liability to the class plaintiffs, the
amount it paid to settle with the class would be a permissible item of
damages.”119
The subsequent history is instructive. On remand from the Sev-
enth Circuit, the defendant corporation moved for summary judg-
ment on the state law claims, arguing that any fraud by the company
had not been the proximate cause of the auditor’s “voluntary” $3.5
million settlement.120 The district court declared that the issue was not
whether the auditor settled, but whether the company’s fraud was a
proximate cause of the auditor’s liability to the class.121 Later, when
the corporation renewed its motion for summary judgement, the dis-
trict court further explicated why the auditor’s claim was not a veiled
attempt at indemnification:
The gist of [the auditor’s] fraud claim is not that it is more equitable
that [the company] pay for [the auditor’s] loss to the class, but that
[the company] has committed a tort on [the auditor], and must pay
damages for this, damages which happen to encompass the settle-
ment payment. That this element of damage overlaps what [the
auditor] maybe could have recovered through indemnity does not
make it indemnity.122
115. Id. at 457–58.
116. Id. at 457.
117. Id. at 457–58.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 458.
120. Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc., 601 F. Supp. 336, 337–38, 341–42 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
121. Id. at 342.
122. Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc., 642 F. Supp. 539, 541–42 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (emphasis
omitted) [hereinafter Cenco II]. After being dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdic-
tion, the auditor pressed its claims for fraud and breach of contract in state court, though the
merits of the auditor’s independent claims were left unresolved because management settled as
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Thus, the auditor’s tort claim provided an avenue to recovering the
securities fraud settlement that was not premised on a right to pay-
ment, but upon the company’s alleged commission of a separate
wrong against the auditor.123
After Cenco, a number of courts have either explicitly or implic-
itly accepted aspects of its analysis.124 Two of these cases are helpful in
illustrating different approaches courts have taken regarding the ex-
tent securities law liabilities may be recovered on independent claims.
The first case, In re Sunrise Securities Litigation125 followed Cenco
in its construction of a bar order entered to protect a settling law firm
from contribution and indemnification claims arising from a settle-
ment of a failed savings and loan.126 When a nonsettling auditor
brought claims against the law firm for intentional misrepresentation,
negligence, breach of contract, and tortious interference, the law firm
attempted to persuade the court that the auditor’s claims (as well as
claims made by other nonsettling parties) were in effect “de facto in-
demnity claims” barred by the court’s order and federal precedent.127
In holding that the independent claims survived the settlement bar
order, the court reasoned:
This case is similar to In re Cenco. The damages that the non-settling
defendants seek for their tort and contract claims are similar, al-
though not identical, to the damages that they seek for their indem-
nification claims. Such an overlap does not necessarily transform the
claims into claims for implied indemnity. The state law cross-claims
which the Outside Directors and [auditor] have asserted against [the
law firm] are based upon duties that it allegedly owed to the outside
Directors, not duties that they and [the law firm] owed to the plain-
the case moved to trial. Young, supra note 25, at 2172–73 (indicating that management of the
successor corporation ultimately surrendered by paying a confidential sum).
123. See id. at 541. (“‘[R]ecovery under principles of contribution or indemnity’ is, quite
simply, a different animal from ‘recovery under principles of direct tort liability.’”) (citation
omitted).
124. See Douglas M. Schwab et al., Claims Between Auditors and Their Clients, in
ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY AFTER ENRON, 29, 50–58 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course,
Handbook Series no. 1309, 2002) (discussing how direct and indirect auditor claims against cli-
ents have been received by the courts); Young, supra note 25, at 2173 n.73 (listing and describ-
ing cases adopting aspects of Cenco).
125. 793 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
126. Id. at 1309–10.
127. Id. at 1321.
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tiffs. . . . They claim that they were directly wronged by [the law
firm].128
The second case, Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, limits the extent to
which federal securities law liabilities may be recovered on independ-
ent state law theories.129 Perhaps influenced by the Fourth Circuit’s
decision three months earlier in Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stock-
bridge,130 the Alvarado court responded to concerns of repackaged
pleading by declaring that “any state claim, however denominated,
which seeks indemnity, may be extinguished through dismissal.”131
Thus, an auditor’s cross-claims for contractual indemnity were barred
because of the “overriding federal concerns at issue.”132 In considering
the nonsettling defendants’ state law claims for breach of warranty,
breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, the court
relied upon Cenco in upholding the validity of independent claims,
but departed from Cenco by initiating an inquiry into the measure of
damages:
[T]o the extent non-settling defendants seek damages . . . measured
by its liability for violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts, such
claims may be extinguished. However, to the extent damages may be
claimed beyond those sought for violation of the Securities and Ex-
change Acts, such claims are independently viable pendent state
claims, and while, in my discretion, I may decline to exercise pen-
dent jurisdiction, I may not “extinguish” them.133
Thus, although both of these approaches hold that independent
claims may not be entirely barred, Alvarado departs from Cenco by
focusing on the measure of damages rather than on the nature of the
128. Id.
129. 723 F. Supp. 540, 551–52 (D. Colo. 1989).
130. 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989) (barring purportedly “independent” actions as “de
facto claims for indemnification”); see also supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
131. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 554.
132. See id. at 553–54 (“[A]ny state claim under an indemnification agreement that is coex-
tensive with a federal indemnification claim may be extinguished because of the overriding fed-
eral concerns at issue.”).
133. Id. at 554 (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Pa-
triot’s Point Dev. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 880, 882 n.2 (D.S.C. 1992) (“The court also notes that the
federal policy of deterrence that prohibits indemnity for violation of federal securities laws may
also bar state law claims of indemnity where the primary liability is measured by the federal se-
curities violations.”).
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claims asserted.134 Parties concerned that damages on independent
theories might be restricted may note that permissible items of dam-
age—apart from judgments or settlements paid to third parties—have
included the costs of defending actions filed by third parties and by
the clients, insiders, and/or shareholders themselves,135 as well as busi-
ness-related damages such as loss of business opportunities, harm to
reputation, and loss of goodwill.136
Temptation to measure damages continues to capture courts
otherwise following Cenco. In a recent $3.2 billion settlement137 be-
tween a consolidated class, a corporation, and an auditor,138 the court
in In re Cendant Corporation Securities Litigation139 dismissed a cor-
poration’s contribution claims,140 but refused the auditor’s motion to
dismiss the corporation’s claims for common law fraud, negligence,
breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.141 The court held that
although the state law claims arose out of the settled claims,142 they
were “independent, non-indemnity claims that are neither barred nor
preempted by the federal securities laws.”143 The court refused the
auditor’s motion to certify for interlocutory appeal whether the
PSLRA bar precludes a defendant from seeking “contribution” under
134. Compare TGB, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 928 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that it would be
fair to bar related claims that seek to recover damages “‘measured by’ the defendant’s liability
to the plaintiff” arising as a result of the settlement while noting that “[n]o court has authorized
barring claims with independent damages”), with In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp.
2d 1, 2, 10 (D.N.J. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss state law claims or in the alternative to
strike “the portion of the damages claim to the extent it seeks to recover any of the $2.8 billion
paid in settlement to plaintiffs” because “‘this element of damages overlaps what [the defen-
dant] maybe could have recovered through indemnity does not make it indemnity’” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (D.N.J. 2001))).
135. Some courts have held that “the American Rule” usually forbids recovery of defense
costs where an entity has admitted that its senior management took part in or perpetrated the
fraud. See In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 918 F. Supp. 749, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (collecting
cases); cf. In re Cendant Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (noting that “usually, joint tortfeasors
must bear their own share of attorneys’ fees, unless one has been absolved of liability”).
136. See Schwab et al., supra note 124, at 45–50 (listing Cenco’s “progeny,” cases involving
auditors’ independent theories seeking to recover federal securities fraud liabilities).
137. In re Cendant Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
138. See In re Cendant Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.N.J. 2001) (referring to an earlier
companion opinion, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001), which
resolved Ernst & Young’s claim against the defendant).
139. 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001).
140. Id. at 593.
141. Id. at 610.
142. Id. at 591–610.
143. Id. at 596.
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independent state law theories.144 Though the court cited Cenco in
holding that an overlap in damages did not “automatically convert the
state law claims into impermissible contribution claims”145 or indem-
nity claims,146 the court nevertheless highlighted that the company’s
alleged damages for diminished value of the company and lost busi-
ness opportunities went “beyond recovery of [the amount] paid in set-
tlement.”147
C. View #3: Whether Independent Claims May Proceed Should Not
Inhibit Entry of A Comprehensive Bar Order
The final view holds that courts may approve settlements stipu-
lating to broad bar orders and decline on Article III grounds from
conclusively determining the order’s ambit.148 The In re Rite Aid Secu-
rities Litigation court held that concerns that the instant settlement
order impermissibly barred potential independent claims were pre-
mature,149 and whether a future action would be precluded as “‘based
upon, arising out of or relating to’ the Settled Claims” was a determi-
nation for whatever future court hears the potential claims based on
“applicable state or federal law,”150 “made on a case-by-case basis.”151
Although the Rite Aid court refused to issue an advisory opinion
on the validity of certain potential claims,152 the court held that some
144. In re Cendant Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1. The court considered briefs submitted
from each party that relied on most of the aforementioned case law.
145. See id. at 10–12 (noting that recovery on independent theories require proof of the
“specific elements related to those claims, e.g., duty, breach, causation, etc.,” thus the independ-
ent claims “are therefore fundamentally different” from contribution).
146. The twin opinions in Cendant held that Cenco’s logic applied equally regardless of
whether an objecting party sought to cast the independent claims as de facto contribution or
indemnity claims. The court declared that the reasoning in its earlier opinion explaining “why
the state law claims were not indemnity claims, applies equally to why those same claims are not
contribution claims.” Id. at 8–9. The court then substituted “contribution” for “indemnification”
and paraphrased the district court’s opinion in Cenco II. Id.
147. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
148. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 724–25, 726–30 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
149. Id. at 729 n.33 (agreeing “that the issue of whether certain particular claims are covered
by any bar order . . . is properly for another court to decide,” but noting that this concern should
not prevent the court from entering an order “so similar” to the bar order entered by the Third
Circuit in Eichenholtz).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 725 n.26.
152. Id. at 725, 730. The court held that:
[T]his type of analysis is exactly the sort that is forbidden under the advisory opinion
jurisprudence. In particular, this sort of claim- or rights-specific analysis would cer-
tainly fail the third prong of the three-part “case or controversy” test . . . in that the
KAPLAN 10/28/02 2:12 PM
238 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:211
classes of claims were excluded from the scope of the bar order. First,
nonsettling officers’ potential insurance and indemnification claims,
as well as the outside auditor’s possible claims against the corporation
for fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and breach of
contract, were not necessarily beyond the order’s purview, but were
“exactly the sort of claims” on which the court found itself prevented
from ruling.153 However, the court was more decisive in dealing with
the nonsettling CEO’s separation claims, as well as the CEO’s and
CFO’s defamation claims, which the court ruled were clearly beyond
the scope of the order.154
IV.  A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Before suggesting how courts should regard indemnity and inde-
pendent claims when entertaining broad bar orders, it is necessary to
note that the Cendant court’s thorough treatment of the issue was
limited by a stipulation of settlement requesting an order extending
only so far as the PSLRA requires.155 Yet, in considering the scope of
any order, the PSLRA’s terms should be regarded as a floor. Al-
though the Cendant court limited its bar order to the specific provi-
sions set forth in the PSLRA, it acknowledged that a bar on inde-
pendent claims was permissible under “pre-existing federal common
law.”156 Unlike the settling parties in, e.g., Bendis, Oil & Gas, Al-
varado, and Rite Aid who requested an order barring related state law
claims in addition to contribution and indemnification claims, the set-
tling parties in Cendant purposefully excluded any language from the
legal issues are not sufficiently defined to permit adjudication. That is, while we may
know the outlines of these asserted rights and claims from the non-settling defen-
dants’ descriptions of them in their briefing, this level of knowledge is not sufficient
for us even to determine whether they would in fact be barred by the language of the
proposed bar order, much less whether they are the sort of claims that are legally
permitted to go forward in the wake of the partial settlement of a securities action.
Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
153. See id. at 731 (holding that it was “for future courts considering these claims to assess
the application of the Bar Order to them. . . . ‘[i]n accordance with otherwise applicable federal
and state law’” (quoting proposed bar order)).
154. Id. at 731–32.
155. In re Cendant Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that in their settle-
ments with the plaintiffs, “Cendant and E & Y sought the entry of settlement bars only to the
extent required by the PSLRA and no further; each sought expressly to reserve its rights to as-
sert any and all claims against the other”).
156. See id. at 6 (“The Court appreciates that several pre-PSLRA cases held that the imposi-
tion of a contribution bar, which might in certain circumstances encompass state law claims, was
permissible and fair in light of the federal policy in favor of settlement of securities suits.”).
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settlement agreement which would have barred independent claims.
This point colored the Cendant decision:
[The company] and [the auditor] sought the entry of settlement bars
only to the extent required by the PSLRA and no further; each
sought expressly to reserve its rights to assert any and all claims
against the other, to the fullest extent allowed by law. . . . [The audi-
tor] cannot have it both ways. It cannot disavow the language which
was extensively and intensively negotiated by arguing that those
claims should be considered to be encompassed by the PSLRA’s
contribution bar because of the pre-existing case law which simply
said that bars against state law claims would be permissible.157
Indeed, the parties had stipulated that the company would remit to
the class one half of any recovery it might obtain against the auditor
following the settlement, a provision that the court found to be “an
implicit acknowledgement that [the company] had the right to pursue
some related claims against [the auditor].”158 Thus, to hold that the
PSLRA bar precludes independent claims would have provided a
windfall to the auditor by providing it rights for which it had not bar-
gained.
Ordinarily, the decision whether to enter an order barring re-
lated state law claims and/or indemnification claims will be difficult.
Although the majority of courts have glossed over the issue, to some
extent the question remains whether the court has the power to bar
noncontribution claims of third parties.159 Where such claims are
merely potential, courts may consider following Rite Aid by issuing a
broad bar order, while leaving the construction of the order’s scope
for a later court to determine at a later time when independent claims
coalesce.160 In the right circumstances, Article III abstention can
sweep a docket of complex litigation and avoid a contentious legal de-
termination.
Yet, underlying courts’ conflicting viewpoints on the validity of
independent claims, there exists a tension between the sound legal
footing on which independent claims stand and the reality that, if suc-
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Although the possibility remains that, where
the court refuses to enter a comprehensive bar order, settling defendants can include indem-
nity/hold harmless provisions in the settlement agreement having effects similar to judgment
set-off mechanisms, see, e.g., supra notes 5 & 111, such extra-judicial agreements will rarely be
as desirable, comforting, or convenient as a bar order entered from the bench.
160. See supra Part III.C.
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cessful, recovery will accomplish exactly that which is barred by fed-
eral precedent concerning indemnification. Overlapping damages
may not transform independent claims into indemnification claims in
theory;161 however, a roundabout recovery of a securities settlement
via independent actions may offend federal policy equally in fact.162
Overt recognition of this tension between law and policy is necessary
to stimulate a more exact deconstruction of federal precedent and de-
termine under what circumstances loss shifting of federal securities
liabilities is tolerable, and when it is not.163
As discussed above, indemnity is intolerable where the underly-
ing claim is premised on a policy of deterrence and liability arises as a
matter of law.164 By analogy, a bar on independent claims by auditors,
underwriters, or broker-dealers that seek to recover, e.g., Section 11
liabilities arising from their own breach of Securities Act duties, will
reinforce the regulatory purpose of the Securities Act and the integ-
rity of the markets.
Yet where liability arises from claims premised upon compensa-
tory legislation (e.g., certain 10b-5 claims),165 permitting independent
actions as well as indemnity may not offend underlying policy so long
as an investor class is made whole. With respect to indemnity, al-
though it is true that 10b-5 liability requires a finding of scienter and
common law principles prohibit indemnification of intentional tort-
feasors,166 if a party neither admits wrongdoing in settling compensa-
tory claims, nor is determined to have acted with “fault,”167 the rea-
161. See supra Part III.B.
162. See Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (de-
claring that, under the 1933 Act’s regulatory framework, “‘the question of who pays the dam-
ages to the plaintiffs is of as great concern as the issue of whether the plaintiffs are to be com-
pensated at all’”) (quoting Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Del.
1974)).
163. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assoc., L.P., 73 F.3d 1276, 1284–85 (1996) (“[C]ommon-
law indemnity is barred altogether where the party seeking indemnification was itself at
fault . . . .”); S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Stone, 749 F.Supp. 1419, 1430 (D.S.C. 1990) (“Indemnity is
similarly unavailable to the third-party plaintiffs on the common law claims . . . . Evidence that
the third-party plaintiff itself is at fault would bar indemnification.”).
167. See Fromer v. Yogel, 50 F. Supp. 2d 227, 234–36, 237–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding an
implied cause of action for indemnity under Rule 10b-5 in an alleged ponzi scheme where the
settling party did not admit fault and the factfinder’s ability to determine fault was foreclosed,
and refusing to allow contribution because the plaintiffs failed to allege joint tortfeasor status);
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soning supporting a bar on indemnification claims disappears.168 In-
deed, courts sanction D&O indemnification under these circum-
stances.169
Finally parties seeking to recover federal securities law liabilities
on independent theories should consider alleging damages distinct
from a securities settlement, cognizant that independent damages
tend to be regarded favorably.170 Courts may look to nontrivial inde-
pendent damage as a screening device to prevent parties from lever-
aging state law claims with speculative or contrived damages against
an otherwise protected settling party.171 The mere recognition of in-
dependent claims can extend enormous leverage to a moving party
based upon the sheer dollar amounts typically at issue.172 Thus,
pleading independent damage, although not technically required, may
be desirable.
CONCLUSION
Four points should be considered in weighing the scope of bar
orders sought in federal securities fraud settlements. First, the court is
see also supra note 53 (noting that courts have been careful to prohibit indemnity based on a
scienter requirement rather than on federal precedent).
168. Arguably, the PSLRA’s adoption of a proportionate fault regime necessarily vindicates
parties either lacking or substantially free of fault from liability that is attributable to another,
rendering full indemnification superfluous.
169. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 101 and notes 135–36 and accompanying text. In the case of an auditor
or underwriter, it is hard to believe that (in the majority of cases) class action settlements would
substantially harm their reputation. Securities fraud class actions are filed routinely. Strike suits
are regarded in the financial community as a transaction cost of doing business. Yet, in the case
of a major fraud or series of frauds, measurable harm to reputation may occur. See, e.g., Ken
Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen’s Fall from Grace Is a Tale of Greed
and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at A1 (claiming that Arthur Andersen’s series of major
accounting scandals “from Sunbeam Corp. to Waste Management Inc. to Enron Corp.” has re-
sulted, in part, in the disintegration and likely death of a company that “once stood as the
world’s largest professional-services firm and whose 85,000 employees last year generated $9.3
billion in revenue”); Robert Frank & Mitchell Pacelle, Andersen, Deloitte Miss Merger Deal by
Inches: Legal Problems Were Sticking Point in Talks, Despite a Good Start, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 2002, at C1 (describing the collapse of “frantic negotiations” in the merger talks between
Arthur Andersen and Deloitte & Touche resulting from concerns over legal liabilities from class
action lawsuits).
171. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.N.J. 2001) (“And this
Court has already rejected the conclusion of Oil & Gas that there is really no distinction be-
tween a contribution claim and one which seeks recovery under a different theory, particularly
when, as here, the claim seeks to recover other types of damages as well.”).
172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting $3.2 billion settlement at issue in
Cendant).
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required by statute to enter a bar on certain contribution claims. Sec-
ond, the court must only consider provisions extending beyond the
statutory contribution bar if petitioned to by the settling parties.
Third, a bar on indemnification claims is generally consistent with
federal precedent. Fourth, it is unsettled whether independent claims
that seek to recover securities liabilities may (1) be barred as “de
facto indemnification claims”; (2) recover limited damages; or (3) are
beyond the purview of settlement bar orders. More likely to survive
even broad bar orders are state law claims that either allege damages
distinct from settlement and litigation costs incurred, or maintain
complete innocence so as to paint the moving party as a victim rather
than as a cotortfeasor.
